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Abstract: 
In this paper we argue that transparency, just as explanation, can be defined at different levels of abstraction. 
We criticize recent attempts to identify the explanation of black box algorithms with making their decisions 
(post-hoc) interpretable. These approaches simplify the real nature of the black boxes and risk misleading the 
public about the normative features of a model. We propose a new form of transparency, that consists in 
explaining the artifact as an intentional product, that serves a particular goal, or multiple goals (Daniel 
Dennet’s design stance), and that provides a measure of the extent to which such goal is achieved, and 
evidence about the way that measure has been reached. We call such idea of transparency ‘design publicity’. 
We argue that design publicity can be more easily linked with the justification of the use and of the design 
of the algorithm, and of each individual decision following from it. Finally, we argue that when models that 
pursue justifiable goals (which may include fairness as avoidance of bias towards specific groups) to a 
justifiable degree are used consistently, the resulting decisions are all justified even if some of them are 
(unavoidably) based on incorrect predictions. For this argument, we rely on John Rawls’s idea of procedural 
justice applied to algorithms conceived as institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we provide a new theory of algorithmic transparency, with a focus on both 
explanations and justifications, where we consider as ‘algorithms’ those human artifacts stemming 
from the training of machine learning models on digital data, in order to generate predictions to 
assist or automate decision-making. These algorithms are subject to intense scrutiny for both 
technical and moral reason, as their applications in product and services is constantly increasing, 
as well as their potential to affect everyone’s lives. Examples come from credit scoring, to digital 
financial coaching and job assistants, automated insurance claim processing bots, smart home 
services, online dating platforms, autonomous driving solutions and policing as well as recidivism 
scoring algorithms. One current limitation of modern algorithmic-assisted decision-making is that 
most advanced machine learning models are considered as ‘black boxes’ or inscrutable (Selbst and 
Barocas 2018). Therefore, the last few years has seen the rise of an active debate in the scientific 
community around interpretability, transparency, explainability and justification of (machine 
learning model-based) algorithms and their outputs. Without a proper understanding of these 
constructs and their outcomes, any decision generated or supported by these algorithms cannot 
be adequately contested.  
According to Lipton (2016), interpretations of machine learning models fall into two 
categories: model transparency and post-hoc explanations. Model transparency is ‘some sense of 
understanding the mechanism by which the model works’ (Lipton 2016, 4). Different ideas may 
be conveyed by demanding that a machine learning model be transparent, each focusing on 
different aspects of the model, its components and the training algorithm (Lipton 2016). On the 
other hand, post-hoc explanations focus on the outcome of the (learned) model; they include 
(Mittelstadt, Russell, and Wachter 2018) natural language processing explanations, visualizations, 
case-based and counterfactual explanations, and local approximations; they can be classified in 
model specific or model agnostic. Local approximation allow, in particular, to explain why a black 
box model produced a selected prediction by approximating it with an interpretable model (e.g. a 
linear regression) around the prediction at hand (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016). We refer to 
the goal of post-hoc explanations of individual decisions as ‘model interpretability’. 
 In this paper, after providing some definitions (2), we start by highlighting some limitations 
of interpretable algorithms, in particular the method of counterfactual explanations, drawing 
support from the recent literature (Selbst and Barocas 2018; Kroll 2018; Kroll et al. 2016) (3). We 
then propose a new concept of algorithmic transparency, which we label ‘transparency as design 
publicity’, and argue that it provides a kind of explanation of their behavior: a teleological explanation, 
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or explanation by design (4). The special value of this explanation is that it links the behavior of 
an algorithm to their justification (5) and, when the algorithm is used consistently, to the procedural 
justice of its decisions. 
2. Machine learning and algorithms: some definitions 
In this section, we introduce some definitions that are relevant for the remainder of this 
contribution. The aim here is to provide the reader with an overview of some commonly used 
concepts in the most recent literature on philosophy of technology and artificial intelligence 
without indulging (too much) in technicalities and jargon. We start with machine learning, which is a 
multidisciplinary discipline “concerned with the question of how to construct computer programs 
that automatically improve with experience” (Mitchell 1997, 7). Machine learning draws on 
concepts from artificial intelligence, information theory, algorithmics and philosophy, among 
others. A machine learning problem ‘can be precisely defined as the problem of improving some 
measure of performance P when executing some task T, through some type of training experience 
E” (Mitchell 1997). Training experience E is represented by (digital) input data, which are 
preprocessed and formatted for the machine learning problem under consideration. Performance 
measures P can be off-the-shelf or ad-hoc, that is engineered by the resources responsible for the 
solution of the corresponding machine learning problem; they provide with an estimation of the 
error made by the solution to the machine learning problem in executing T, using experience E. 
What does it mean to solve a machine learning problem? Essentially, it consists of 
specifying a class H of mathematical constructs called machine learning models, to be trained on input 
data D using a set of algorithms implemented in computer-understandable programming languages 
(Mitchell 1997). Therefore, through the algorithms in the training process, the best machine 
learning model is trained or learned. The result of this process is an object in a programming 
language embedded in an IT infrastructure to generate predictions on new data with the goal to 
assist or automate decision-making; such complex, dynamic computer system becomes a 
“cognitive engine” at the core of products and services mentioned in (1). In the remainder of these 
notes, we will call this object “algorithm”; in fact, this is an algorithm - i.e. a procedure or rule to 
compute predictions from input (new) data points - and stemming from the training of machine 
learning models to solve a given machine learning problem. We will come back to the teleological 
nature of algorithms in (4). 
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3. Post-hoc Explainability: limitations of counterfactual explanations 
As discussed by Selbst and Barocas “interpretability has received considerable attention in research 
and practice due to the widely held belief that there is a tension between how well a model will 
perform and how well humans will be able to interpret it” (2018, 1110). We now explain more 
theoretically, with reference to prior work by Selbst and Barocas, why post-hoc interpretability 
explanations lead to partial understanding and are apt to be misleading, and why this should be 
considered problematic. We shall focus on counterfactual explanations, which recently drew 
attention in the artificial intelligence research community (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 2017). 
In the same paper, the author states that counterfactuals1 1) are “a novel type of explanation of 
automated decisions that overcomes many challenges facing current work on algorithmic 
interpretability and accountability” (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 2017, 5), 2) “should be used 
as a means to provide explanations for individual decisions” (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 
2017, 7), and 3) “can bridge the gap between the interests of data subjects and data controllers that 
otherwise acts as a barrier to a legally binding right to explanation” (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and 
Russell 2017, 5). 
For simplicity, we do not consider the theory of counterfactuals and causality, limiting our 
considerations to machine learning counterfactuals only. We will argue that an individual, who 
understands a counterfactual explanation, without understanding the limitations of the approach, 
will potentially attribute to the feature mentioned in one or a limited set of counterfactuals an 
importance that is not objectively justified. The method of counterfactual explanation misleads by 
suggesting that some ceteris paribus clauses (among many) have an importance that they do not have. 
This is clearly an instance of the more general problem described by Selbst and Barocas (2018): 
contemporary machine learning models are designed to reflect the complexity of reality: they 
involve many variables, that interact in complex ways, which are hard to grasp intuitively. 
Counterfactual explanations achieve a reduction of such complexity, but “there will be situations 
where complexity cannot be avoided in a faithful representation of the scoring system, and listing 
factors alone will fail to accurately explain the decision”2. In particular, counterfactual explanations, 
like others, suggest that complex decision are explained by the causal role of a limited number of 
features. This can be problematic when, for example, there are in fact many features playing an 
equivalently important, or near equivalently important role (Selbst and Barocas 2018, 1115).  
                                               
1 In these notes, we will use the terms “counterfactual explanations” and “counterfactuals” interchangeably. 
2 In this passage, the authors refer to the eight-feature credit scoring system by Taylor and discussed in (Taylor 1980). 
We will consider the model later in this section, we discussing selection bias in counterfactual explanations. 
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 Let us now discuss counterfactual explanations in some detail. To this end, let M be a 
machine learning model (implemented via algorithms in a computer understandable programming 
language and trained on a dataset D) that computes a real number p called score, for each data 
point x in D (or for new inputs). Data points are nothing but finite strings of alphanumerical values 
which are realizations of a finite set of (random) variables (V_1,...,V_n). In this setting, for each 
data point x, the machine learning model returns a score value p(x), which is a function of the 
values of the variables (V_1, ..., V_n) at the point x. The definition of counterfactual explanations 
is: 
statements taking the form: Score p was returned because variables V had values (v1, 
v2,...) associated with them. If V instead had values (v1', v2',...), and all other variables 
had remained constant, score p' would have been returned. (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and 
Russell 2018, 9) 
From the very definition it follows that counterfactual explanations in the sense of Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Russell (2017) are an application of the ceteris paribus principle, namely they identify 
the explanation of a score with a factor whose change affects the score keeping all other factors 
equal. The world in which inference is generated following the ceteris paribus principle is 
represented by all the possible realizations of the random variables (V_1, ..., V_n). 
The choice of which factors to keep constant and which one to vary affects the choice of 
counterfactual explanation to propose, which “would alter values as little as possible” (Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Russell 2018, 9) and it is claimed to metaphysically correspond to the closest 
possible world. An example of counterfactual explanation, offered again by Wachter, Mittelstadt, 
and Russell: “You were denied a loan because your annual income was £30,000. If your income had been 
£45,000, you would have been offered a loan” (2017, 5). Here a machine learning model classifies each 
individual's creditability as function of annual income and (possibly) other variables which are not 
mentioned in the counterfactual explanation itself. The sentence “If you income...have been offered a 
loan” represents the “counterfactual scenario”, which is defined once new values for the variable 
“annual income” are generated, keeping all other variables, if any, as fixed (that is, ceteris paribus). 
The data point characterized by the annual income value of £45,000 is said to be synthetic. We 
note that in the counterfactual scenario, the outcome of the modelling exercise - i.e. the credit-
worthiness level expressed by the acceptance or rejection of a loan request - changes with respect 
to the original data point, which is characterized by an annual income of £30,000.  
Clearly, counterfactual explanations intercept only local properties of the model, where 
locality refers to a given data point x whose outcome is the explanandum under consideration. We 
note that, in general, a synthetic data point could be close to the original data point under 
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consideration, while showing different values with respect to it for all the variables in the data set. 
We argue that counterfactual explanations are vulnerable to at least three objections: 
1) Selection bias in ceteris paribus: in case ceteris paribus is used to generate counterfactuals, one has to 
choose a subset of variables to generate synthetic data points. This choice reflects personal bias 
on interpretability of the machine learning model at hand by the individual performing the 
counterfactual routines. To our knowledge, no study focuses on rationale for the selection of 
variables to generate counterfactuals, or discusses empirical evidence from experiments on this 
topic. The choice of the variables to keep fixed in the ceteris paribus procedure is linked with the 
problem of informativeness of the outcome explanations. This is the case of Taylor’s eight-feature 
credit-scoring system (Taylor 1980), where “choosing arbitrarily among equivalently valid reasons 
runs counter to the instruction to give specific and actionable notice” (Selbst & Barocas 2018,  
1103) and “If the creditor tried to explain these rules simply, it would leave information out, but 
if the creditor were to explain in complete detail, it would likely overwhelm a credit applicant” 
(Selbst & Barocas 2018,  1103). 
2) Closest world arbitrariness and metaphysical coherence: algorithms to generate synthetic data points use 
distance functions. One wants to select synthetic data maximizing the distance with respect to the 
original data point when considering the machine learning outcome (e.g. “loan” vs. “no loan”), 
but points closed to the original data point (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 2017). Clearly, 
distance functions are arbitrary. A throughout analysis of counterfactuals generation as function 
of different distance functions (while tuning their parameters) is needed, especially given what are 
considered open problems in the logic of counterfactuals, relative to the identification of the 
“nearest possible world”. Several philosophers have analyzed counterfactual claims by appealing 
to this concept (Todd 1964; Stalnaker and Thomason 1970; Lewis 2013; Nute 1976). No proof 
has been given that any mathematically defined distance function corresponds to the relation 
“being the closest possible world” invoked in the logic of counterfactuals.   
3) Lack of ontological scalability: the problem of closest world arbitrariness may be overcome by 
assigning to the “interpreter” of a machine learning model the task of excluding some potential 
explanations based on common-sense assumptions about what counterfactuals are irrelevant (e.g. “if 
your 50 m2 apartment had 4 rooms, it would sell at $300’000”), as counterfactual possibilities too 
distant from the real world are not useful as explanations. If that is the way counterfactual 
explanations are supposed to be given, the method faces the problem of lack of scalability. 
Mathematical routines can generate synthetic data points but do not guarantee their consistency 
with the criterion of possible world similarity based on the common-sense intuitions about the 
closeness of possible worlds of the interpreter. In a big-data context, i.e. in presence of hundreds 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404040 
7 
 
or thousands of variables and synthetic data points, hard-coding constraints in the synthetic data 
generating algorithm that reflect a priori criteria of plausibility or possibility is an unviable strategy, 
due to the time needed for considering all possible scenarios. In summary, counterfactual 
explanations based on the generation of synthetic data points do not scale in big-data contexts and 
suffer of potential lack of ontological coherence.  
4) Lack of normative informativeness A fourth problem affecting counterfactual explanations is the one 
of inferring normative properties of the model from explanations of individual decisions. As will be 
later argued, we think that the most practically important normative properties of model-based 
decisions emerge from repeated application of the model – they are properties of the kind of 
patterns, e.g. the distribution of errors, or of benefits, between groups, or of groups defined by 
morally salient properties, that emerge when the law of large numbers applies. A case in point is 
indirect discrimination or disparate impact, which can be considered morally or legally relevant in 
certain contexts, but cannot be determined with such methods, because it can exist even when 
information about a protected category plays no role at all in a decision (Selbst and Barocas 2018, 
1105). Another example is the property of separation – the fact that the false positive and false 
negative rate is statistically dependent on membership to a protected group (Hardt et al 2016). The 
risk here is to falsely infer that, since sex or race play no role in the counterfactual explanation of 
decisions by an algorithm, the system cannot be biased against a particular sex or race. 
Interestingly, the opposite misunderstanding may also occur. In some cases, protected group 
characteristics may be necessary to avoid discrimination in data-driven decision models, for 
example because they are necessary to avoid omitted variable bias (Žliobaitė and Custers 2016). A 
counterfactual explanation may show that a decision, e.g. concerning a loan, would have been 
different had the individual been of a different race. This may lead the public to consider the 
system discriminatory, even when the information about the protected group is used to make the 
prediction fairer.  
 Thus, we conclude that counterfactual explanations do not ensure that there is a way to 
evaluate the justification of algorithmic decision-making. In what follows, we provide a model of 
transparency that relies on explanations that are relevant for the justification of algorithmic 
decisions and, thus, their public acceptability.3 We do not maintain that transparency as design 
                                               
3 By public acceptability we do not mean public in the sense of Rawlsian public reason (Rawls 1996; Binns 2018), 
which involves standards of justification which can be shared by individuals with different conceptions of the good 
sharing a commitment to core liberal and democratic values and principles. We assume that different standards of 
justification will be employed in different contexts and by different publics. 
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publicity – the approach we propose – fulfill all the desiderata various authors have associated with 
explainable and interpretable AI. Our transparency idea serves a particular purpose: that of 
normative justification. It provides the kind of explanation which is useful for the public to assess 
if the deployment of algorithmic decision-making and the decisions following from it is justifiable.  
4. Design explanation of algorithms and their property of design, value, translation, performance, 
and consistency transparencies 
 
As showed by Kroll (2018), the thesis that the understanding and transparency of algorithmic-
assisted decision-making is limited by the inscrutability of the machine learning models and their 
algorithms (i.e. the fact that they are opaque or “black boxes”) is criticizable. The debate on 
algorithm inscrutability mostly depends on the meaning we attribute to the expression “explaining 
the model’ and accordingly “understanding the model”.  
Explanation - the process and product (Ruben 2012) of making something understandable 
- has many meanings: definition, interpretation, individuation of the necessary conditions or 
sufficient conditions, of purposes, of functions, and of goals. An explanation is effective when the 
x that is explained is clear and open to people that want to understand x. An effective explanation 
renders an object understandable and its understandability contributes to the transparency of the 
object, i.e. the quality of being easy to see through, analyze, and assess. 
The explanation of the behavior of an algorithmic system has not only different meanings 
but also different levels of abstraction to which it can refer. If the explanation of a model is meant 
in mechanistic terms, then the algorithm functioning may be difficult to understand even to 
computer scientists and engineers. An explanation that clarifies the purpose of algorithms would be 
understandable to the public, from the end users with low expertise to policymakers in the need 
of justifying the use of algorithmic-assisted decision-making, to corporate executives adopting 
such models, to computer scientists and engineers that design them. The explanation of the 
purpose of an algorithmic system is an explanation by intelligent design (or, more briefly, a design 
explanation), namely it explains an x by referring to that for the sake of which x was created. This 
explanation is more abstract than the mechanistic one and corresponds to Dennett’s design stance, 
namely the intellectual strategy by which we explain the behavior of a system by referring to its 
purpose and intentional design (Dennett 1987). Design explanations are teleological and focus on 
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the final cause of a system (Aristotle, Phys. II, 3; Metaphys. V, 2).4 Design explanation is applicable 
to algorithms as the latter are goal-directed, they are human artifacts produced in a specific 
sociotechnical context (Baker 2004). In the design explanation of a common object such as a chair, 
we provide the reasons for which the chair was designed as such: being stable and comfortable; 
these goals directed the design of the chair and explain why respectively the chair has four or three 
legs and has an ergonomic or flat surface in the spot in which we sit down. The design explanation 
of an algorithm comprises “the understanding of what the algorithm was designed to do, how it 
was designed to do that, and why it was designed in that particular way instead of some other way” 
(Kroll 2018, 4). In other words, explaining the purpose of an algorithm requires giving information 
on various elements: the goal that the algorithm pursues, the mathematical constructs into which 
the goal or its proxy is translated in order to be implemented in the algorithm, and the tests and 
the data with which the performance of the algorithm was verified. Design transparency, the providing 
of information about these elements, contributes to an explanation of the artifact by design. As 
design explanation is made of different elements, similarly design transparency can be split into 
various components: value transparency, translation transparency, and performance transparency, as we will 
now show.  
The goal of an algorithm is something valuable that is achieved. Since it is something that is 
desired by a person or group, we can also call it a good or value for that person or group. Value 
transparency should also indicate why and for whom the goal is valuable, when this is not obvious 
from the context. The design goal (e.g. identify the most profitable clients, minimize hospital 
readmissions) is typically also the goal of the person who decides to employ the artifact in practice. 
Thus, it also figures in the intentional explanation of the action to develop, or purchase, and employ 
the AI, by the persons accountable for such decisions. Thus, the design explanation should indicate 
which is the goal – the reasons or motivations – of the computer scientists and engineers who 
designed the algorithm and of the persons accountable for its employment in real-world settings. 
These goals should be one and the same; when this is not the case the artifact does not respond 
to the reasons of the person who are supposed to have meaningful human control (Santoni de Sio 
and Van den Hoven 2018) over it. This is problematic for accountability. The goal of an algorithm 
is usually a practical objective, such as profit or efficient allocation of scarce resources, but can 
                                               
4 The final cause described by Aristotle can be used to explain the behavior of entities with no psychological states 
(desires, beliefs, conscious purposes, etc.) such as algorithmic systems, as Aristotle applies the teleological model of 
explanation to natural processes, which have no psychological states (Broadie 1987; Gotthelf 1976). 
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include moral values such as equity, beneficence, trustworthiness, and the rules that are socially 
accepted as pertinent for the domain in which the model is employed. In both cases, the goal 
introduces normativity in the model, as it represents something that there are good reasons to 
pursue. Hence, normative choices are made both when normative standards are explicitly invoked 
in the design of a model and when they are ignored. As Binns points out: 
[W]hen attempting to modify a model to remove algorithmic discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, religion or other protected attributes, the data scientist will 
inevitably have to embed, in a mathematically explicit way, a set of moral and political 
constraints (Binns 2018, 547). 
The goals or values that guide the design of algorithmic models should therefore be included in 
an explanation of such models. Value transparency is the result of an explanation that makes the 
standards, norms, and goal that were implemented in the system accessible. These normative 
elements should also correspond to the reasons for which it was deployed.  
 The goal of an algorithmic system needs to be translated into something that is measured: 
a set of rules with which the algorithm elaborates inputs and produce outputs. A machine learning 
algorithm requires the quantification of the goal because, in particular, the algorithm that generates 
the model needs to quantify the departure from the model objectives of several potential candidate 
models. There is no straightforward and only one translation of a goal into a mathematic construct. 
For this reason, making such translation a publicly verifiable criteria provides the public and 
scientific community with the information to assess how a given goal is operationalized in 
machine-language. Making this piece of information public constitutes translation transparency, which 
is part of design transparency. In applications, it is possible to have alternative translations in 
machine language of the same goal. For example, let us consider the problem of designing a 
predictive model of customer churn5 for an airline company. The goal is to design and implement 
a predictive model of customer churn in order to assess future profitability of a given portfolio of 
customers. However, in the case of an airline company, the business concept of “churn’ could be 
translated into different set of computer-understandable rules. In one case, one could simply 
define a customer as churned if no revenue is generated by the customer in a given year of interest. 
On the other hand, one could introduce churn as the absence of revenue in a given year of interest 
and the lack of flying activities (i.e. avoiding the case of zero-revenue generating customers flying 
                                               
5 To churn or to lapse is the activity of moving out a given group. In business, it refers to the activity of customers to 
move out of portfolios. Predictive models of customer churns are important to organizations to predict the volumes 
of portfolios in (future) timeframes and to assess their (future) profitability. 
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using promotions). Both choices lead to alternative implementations of the same business goal. 
Design transparency recommends to explain the definition of churn and its motivations to the 
public. Another example is the goal of fairness or avoiding discrimination. Different definitions of 
fairness for predictive models exist and it is often impossible to satisfy all of them simultaneously 
(Berk et al. 2017). One definition requires that the probability of a favorable prediction be 
statistically independent of group membership (statistical parity). Another one, proposed by Hardt 
(2016), requires the favorable probability to be statistically independent of group membership only 
for those individuals who have the actual feature that the predictive model tries to predict (equality 
of opportunity). Design transparency requires declaring which fairness definition has been 
adopted, and, if possible, to provide a justification of such choice.     
 Once the criteria to measure degree of goal achievement are specified, a design explanation 
of an algorithm should provide information on the effective achievement of such objectives in the 
environment for which the system was built. In fact, for instance, the mere implementation of the 
most advanced norms of equal treatment in a credit-granting system does not warrant that the 
system will be effectively impartial. The impact of the algorithms and its outcomes needs to be 
considered. Performance transparency consists in indicating the logic with which the algorithm has 
been tested in order to verify how much it departed from achieving the goal and in indicating the 
results of such logic, starting with the choice of performance measures used in both training phase 
and during the assessment of the model on test data.6 These latter are data that have not been used 
during training and whose scope is to assess the adaptability of the model to unseen inputs. The 
test data are part of performance transparency as the choice and the quality of them, which can be 
subject to biases, influences the performance measure and thus the assessment of the algorithm.  
In summary, an algorithmic system has the property of design transparency if and only if 
it provides the public with the goal of the algorithm (value transparency), how this goal was 
translated into programming language (translation transparency), how the algorithm rule achieves 
that goal and how the goal achievement has been assessed (performance transparency). 
 An important difficulty here concerns the explanation of the singular decisions by the 
artifact, which should be distinguished logically from the nature of the artifact itself. The 
algorithm’s performance connects the explanation of the artifact (i.e. an algorithm, or rule) with 
                                               
6 Training and test data are often the result of a random split of an original set of data used for modelling purposes. 
This implies that the object resulting from training and the outcomes of which are the object of the explainability 
analysis is in reality a pair consisting of the model and a random seed, which is the integer value chosen by the analyst 
that governs the randomness in the routines leading to the training of the model itself.  
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the application of the rule to particular cases. The simple solution is to view each individual 
decision as a means through which the artifact achieves the overall goal for which it has been 
designed. This explanation is however problematic in the light of the fact that, when algorithmic 
decisions are based on statistical predictions, it will often fail to decide in a way that directly 
promotes the goal the model is designed to achieve. E.g. a loan is refused to someone willing and 
able to repay it, an inmate who will not reoffend is denied parole, a patient is prematurely released 
from the hospital, causing readmission. This is due to the fact that decisions based about imperfect 
predictions about stochastic events will typically be often wrong, but sufficiently often right to 
justify the use of the model in practice. In the next section we are going to show why even the 
statistical imperfection of a model can be justified by appealing to its design goals and the trade-
offs between all values pertaining to the justification of its use.  
There is a further type of transparency – consistency transparency – that contributes to explain 
individual decisions by algorithms, given the assumption that the employment of such systems 
should be minimally fair. Consistency transparency is showing proof that consistency is achieved, 
i.e that the algorithm always generates predictions by the same rules even when we cannot observe 
those rules in operation. Consistency is not a feature of the model but of its deployment. It does not 
contribute to explain why the model works in a certain way, but why certain decisions are made 
(namely, they result from applying the model consistently). Consistency can even be a property of 
the deployment an algorithm that applies a discriminatory rule such as filtering job candidates by 
their residence address. Nonetheless, as consistency transparency shows that identical cases are 
treated identically, it represents the first step towards fairness; it is a sort of basic requirement of 
fairness that, as we shall show, is necessary but not sufficient to justify it.  
In some cases, models are unidentifiable, by which we mean that in most AI powered 
solutions the underlying machine learning models are updated (i.e. retrained) with frequencies that 
depend on the domain of applicability of the solution itself. This implies that an AI potentially 
generates different outcomes for the same end user, depending on the moment at which the 
outcome is generated: any explanation of this outcome (for the purpose of contesting or auditing 
it, for example) depends on time, as well. Consistency transparency requires that changes in a 
model be declared because, as we shall maintain, this is relevant for their justification. Consistency 
is a normative goal and showing that it is achieved by the model contributes to explaining why an 
individual decision is made – namely, by showing that it is explained by a normative consideration. 
Conversely, the failure to satisfy consistency implies that the decisions of the model can be 
challenged on a specific normative ground. 
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In conclusion, the design explanation of the model shows that an algorithmic model gives 
a decisional outcome because the model pursues a certain goal (value transparency), which is 
translated into mathematical constructs implemented in the algorithm (translation transparency), 
which in turn enables to verify whether the model achieves the goal (performance transparency). 
When, as in most cases, consistency is among the reasonable goals of model deployment, the 
explanation of the decisions by the model includes consistency transparency.  
5. Design publicity and justification 
In what follows, we argue that transparency conceived as design publicity provides explanations 
that are useful to assess if the model is justified. The explanations provided by design publicity 
relate directly to the question of explanation. Design publicity provides information about a) the 
goal the algorithm is designed to pursue and the moral constraints it is designed to respect (value 
transparency); b) the way this goal is translated into a problem that can be solved by machine 
learning (translation transparency), c) the performance of the algorithm in addressing problem 
(performance transparency), and d) a proof of the fact that decisions are taken by consistently 
applying the same algorithm (consistency transparency).  Let us now consider how each of these 
elements contributes to the justification of using an algorithm and of the decisions that follow 
from its use. 
Let us begin with the goal or goals the algorithm is designed to pursue. All algorithms are 
designed to pursue primary goal (e.g. a business objective); some more advanced algorithms are also 
designed to take into consideration a plurality of different values, such as fairness or privacy, that often 
can be conceptualized as moral or legal constraints. Constraints are typically in trade-off with the 
primary goal and affect the way and the extent to which the primary goal can be achieved. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will refer to both goals and constraints (as “goals”), in what follows.  
The first step of the justification of decision taken by an algorithm, thus, requires evaluating 
the goals and constraints that the algorithm, respectively, achieves and respects. In a justified 
algorithm, they reflect those values and constraints a reasonable person may want to see 
promoted/respected in the context of a service.  
The primary goal of the algorithm matters for the justification of the decisions that follow 
from its employment on people, even if the goal is not what people commonly perceive as a 
political, moral or legal value. Consider the goal of maximizing the amount debt that is repaid, 
when lending. This optimization can be justified prudentially: the company cannot be profitable if 
it lends too much money to people who cannot repay their loans. The optimization goal can also 
be justified, morally, legally, or in terms of legitimate authorities. Prudentially speaking, a company 
needs to achieve this goal to be profitable and stay in business. Morally speaking, credit contributes 
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to wealth that contributes to the general welfare. Financial instability, on the other hand, has 
negative implications on the general welfare, as recent economic events – e.g. the subprime crisis 
– have shown. Alternatively, one may invoke the legal freedom to conduct business, which is 
legally protected in many countries.  
Primary goals matter to justification when they are valuable goals, e.g. there are good reasons 
to pursue such goals, which can be explained by reference to moral, political or legal values. Other 
goals (the “constraining” goals) typically reflect value considerations, e.g. privacy, or fairness. 
Different types of justification are possible, for example in terms of common, or philosophical 
morality, of the law, of by virtue of political principles and values, that may be universal or 
characteristic of the society in which the model operates.  
Take, for example, “anti-discrimination measures incorporated within [a] model to prevent 
it from giving higher credit risk scores to members of groups which have historically been 
discriminated against” (Binns 2018, 548). “Anti-discrimination” is the general name of a value that 
society expects from a service lending money to individuals, and that contributes to define the goal 
of the algorithms (in this case, by affecting the way and accuracy with which it will be pursued). 
Such goal is considered when designing the algorithm for moral, legal, or reputational reasons. 
Algorithmic transparency requires that these normative goals and the reasons for considering them 
are clearly specified – i.e. the choice of such normative goal is not a mere arbitrary decision by the 
data scientists. Goal transparency contributes to the ability of the public to understand and assess 
the validity of a potential justification for accepting decisions taken by a model pursuing such goal. 
If the goals pursued by a model are not values worth pursuing, the decisions following from the 
model are not justified. 
 An algorithm pursuing such goals will achieve them to a determined degree, which is 
expressed by “performance transparency”. The performance can only be assessed by translating 
the goals in question into measurable quantities. This exercise of translation is not trivial. As Pak-
Hang Wong observes “the idea of […] algorithmic fairness is […] contestable […] there is a great 
number of definitions of what […] algorithmic fairness amounts to, and it seems unlikely for 
researchers […] to settle on the definition of fairness any time soon” (Wong 2019). Translation 
transparency requires that the translation be declared and reasons, if any, for such choice. If the 
value translation is not justified, or at least justifiable, the decisions of the model are not justified.
 Notice that transparency as design publicity – the approach we favor – does not require that 
individuals that are accountable for algorithmic decisions provide full justifications. It is sufficient 
that they declare the elements that are needed for one, that we identify with the values they are 
pursuing, the translation they adopt, and the extent to which the quantified values are achieved 
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(performance transparency). Performance transparency is especially important when there are 
trade-offs between different values simultaneously pursued by a model. Performance metrics 
provide an important indication of the extent to which every value has been achieved, which is 
especially important for the overall justification of the system when a value can only be achieved 
at the expense of another value. For example, fairness can only be pursued at the expense of 
efficiency; in the case of the recidivism predictions, optimizing for fairness measures leads to a 
partial failure to release some high-risk detainees, that are mistakenly classified as low-risk, or a 
partial failure to release low-risk ones (Corbett-Davies et al. 2017; Wong 2019). Performance 
transparency provides an indication of the degree to which both values, of efficiency and 
(quantified) fairness have been sacrificed.   
There is still a gap in the justification of individual decisions. As anticipated, the fact that 
prediction-based decisions will often be wrong can be justified. In the case of machine learning-
driven algorithms, individual mistreatment happens because the information necessary to always 
make perfect predictions does not exist. And even the information required to make a model more 
accurate may be too costly to collect, or cannot be collected in morally permissible ways. It is 
known that value-driven design that considers privacy and non-discrimination pays a price in terms 
of predictive accuracy (Hajian et al. 2015) and efficiency (Corbett-Davies et al 2017). A further 
reason why errors are unavoidable is that some outcomes result from human free will, for example, 
success during parole. The same considerations (of cost, privacy, or fairness) justify statistical 
decisions that rely on incomplete information, even when it is theoretically possible to collect and 
analyze all the information that matters, in principle, if one is to treat each individual case “as a 
distinct individual” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2010).  
An individual subjected to an unfavorable decision may accept, in principle, that the 
algorithm is justified as a whole, yet challenge the necessity of implementing the model when taking 
a decision about him. The particular individual may argue: “I understand that the algorithm achieves 
these goals and that it does so in a reasonable way. But why can’t you make an exception for me?”. 
This would violate consistency. For example, suppose that a software is used to randomize access 
to scarce life-saving resources in a hospital of a dystopian country. This software translates fairness 
into a basic mathematical condition, which is equal chances of getting the resource in question. 
This goal can be achieved by an algorithm whose outcome is completely random. Yet consistency 
would be violated if, when the case of head physician’s son is submitted to it, the randomized 
model is no longer used by the person in charge, who recognizes the head surgeon son, and assigns 
the resource to him. In this case, the software does not satisfy consistency.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404040 
16 
 
The violation of consistency for an arbitrary reason (e.g. the head physician son’s case) is 
incompatible with equal respect; on the other hand, if the same exception were made for everyone 
who had an interest to demand it, the algorithm wouldn’t achieve its design goals, which justify its 
use. The violation of consistency is incompatible with formal justice “the impartial and consistent 
administration of laws and institutions” (Rawls 1999, 50–51), applied to the algorithm, considered 
as a law, or as an institution. This is why – we maintain – algorithms that change their identity as 
they are used are normatively problematic in high-stake decisions. In such cases, any change due 
to retraining should be at least publicized, and justified, by pointing out a considerable 
improvement in performance, which overrides consistency concerns. 
When the design of an algorithm is justified, then, if the algorithm is also used consistently, 
we obtain a procedural justification of all the decisions that follow from it. To explain this kind of 
justification, we draw from Rawls’s idea of the justification of individual shares of the goods 
produced by cooperation (1999, p 76-77). Rawls rejects the idea of allocative justice, namely, he 
rejects describing justice as a property of the end-state of process of the distribution of goods, a 
property independent from how that distribution came about. For example, an end-state 
distribution is just, according to a resource egalitarian account, if and only if resources are equally 
distributed, according to a meritocratic account, if and only if resources are proportional to each 
person’s contribution to society, and according to a utilitarian one, if and only if the distribution 
maximizes utility. As Nozick (1974) observes, these allocative end-states are undermined by 
processes, like markets, that are not fully deterministic, because they are perturbed by human free 
decisions. In Nozick’s slogan, liberty upsets patterns. Importantly, this applies to many cases of 
algorithmic decision-making, where the outcomes that justify the decision are future events that 
depend from the free will of an individual. According to non-compatibilist libertarianism, believing 
that an inmate success on parole could be predicted with perfect precision is tantamount to 
denying that the inmate has free will. 
This gives us a moral reason to consider Rawls’s procedural alternative to end-state 
conceptions. In this case, distributive shares are just if they result from just institutions. But unlike 
Nozick, Rawls relates the justification of institutions to the outcomes they tend to bring about, 
their general statistical tendencies, considered from a suitably general perspective. As in Hume it 
is the “general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous” (Hume 2000, secs. III-iii–1), 
not every single decision considered individually. The outcomes which justify the institutions are 
characterized by Rawlsian principles of justice. Rawls (1999), for examples, requires economic 
institutions as a whole (including taxation) to maximize the expectations of the worst off groups 
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in society. If institutions are justified, and if they are consistently and impartially applied, then the 
outcomes of free human decisions constrained by institutions are just, whatever they are. 
For algorithmic decision-making, the principles of justice correspond to its design goals.  
The design goals of the algorithm are that which justifies an algorithm which amounts to specific rules 
(including inscrutable complex ones). To assess if inscrutable algorithms satisfy their “principles 
of justice” we consider their performance. If they do, the consistent and impartial application of the 
algorithm to individual cases corresponds to the consistent and impartial administration of just 
institutions. Summing up in one word: we are bound by procedural justice to accept as just all decisions 
that result from the consistent application of an algorithm that is justified by design.  
Notice that, in the institutional case, the fact that institutions are administered consistently and 
impartially is a public fact. This publicity is achieved thanks to special procedures. E.g. the consistent 
fulfillment of the legal obligations emerging from civil law can be tested by going to court. In the 
algorithmic case, the consistent application of inscrutably complex rules appears to lack transparency. 
The solution to this is to provide a technical solution that delivers a proof that the rules are 
followed – that is, consistency – even when the rules themselves are not transparent to anyone 
because the algorithm is a black box; it appears that this is indeed technically feasible (Kroll et al. 
2016, 665–71). 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we discuss what it means to achieve transparency for algorithms, i.e. the provision of 
explanations to see through, analyze, and assess artifacts trained on data via machine learning 
methods and generating predictions to assist or automate decision-making. We propose a form of 
transparency that consists in the publicizing the design of an artifact (including value, translation and 
performance) as well as its consistent application. We maintain that this kind of transparency provides 
1) an explanation of the artifact, namely, an explanation “by design”; 2) an intentional explanation of 
its deployment; 3) a justification of its use; 4) when used consistently, a procedural justification of 
the individual decisions it takes. 
The proposed approach to algorithmic transparency deviates from the existing body of 
literature on explainable artificial intelligence (xAI), where the concept of transparency focuses on 
the explanation of the inner workings of algorithms or the interpretability of their individual 
outcomes (Lipton 2016; Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016). We do not claim here that 
transparency as design publicity achieves the goals that these approaches are said to achieve. 
Rather, we stress that transparency as design publicity achieves a distinct goal, namely, providing 
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the public with the essential elements that are needed in order to assess the justification (and, when 
consistency is satisfied, procedural justice) of the decisions that follow from its deployment. 
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